The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 39
Number 2 Parameters Summer 2009

Article 10

5-1-2009

An Ever-Expanding War: Legal Aspects of Online Strategic
Communication
Daniel Silverberg
Joseph Heimann

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Daniel Silverberg & Joseph Heimann, "An Ever-Expanding War: Legal Aspects of Online Strategic
Communication," Parameters 39, no. 2 (2009), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2477.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

An Ever-Expanding War:
Legal Aspects of Online
Strategic Communication
DANIEL SILVERBERG and JOSEPH HEIMANN
© Daniel Silverberg 2009

N

early eight years after 9/11, senior US leadership is redefining the “war
on terrorism” as a global counterinsurgency effort, one that requires
both kinetic force and indirect, “smart power” collaboration by civilian
agencies. “The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens
that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past,” said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. “Forced by circumstances, our brave men
and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils—usually
in a language they don’t speak . . . . But it is no replacement for the real
thing, civilian involvement and expertise.”1
Although the requirement for interagency cooperation is a neartruism of US national security policy today, finding the appropriate role
for the Department of Defense (DOD) remains a key challenge. This article examines one aspect of activities that potentially overlap with other government departments, DOD’s growing involvement in the “battle of
ideas.”2 Much consternation exists in the foreign policy community regarding DOD’s expansion into missions traditionally performed by civilian agencies.3 A small but critical example of this growth involves DOD’s
efforts to use the Internet to “craft a positive perception” abroad,
while attacking the ideological underpinnings of terrorism.4 In midSummer 2009
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2007, the Department of Defense issued policies authorizing commanders to engage foreign audiences via online interactive methods,
such as texting, blogging, e-mail, and regionally focused Web sites.5
The guidance was in direct response to long-standing complaints from
the ten regional and functional Combatant Commanders that a terrorist could post videos of a beheading or other form of extremist propaganda, unhindered by policy considerations, whereas US commanders had
to navigate “legal” hurdles to get psychological operations (PSYOP) videos and themes approved.6
A key issue is whether these online activities, while critical to overall American strategic communication efforts, are properly characterized
as “military missions,” that make use of DOD funding. DOD’s communication activities are increasingly separated in time and space from a kinetic
mission; are directed at broad, cross-regional audiences; and, on their face,
appear more like a public diplomacy campaign than a military program.7
It would be unfair to fault DOD for its involvement in such hybrid
activities. The Department is arguably filling a need where resource-strapped
civilian agencies might be falling short. PSYOP are a key aspect of counterinsurgency efforts. As former participants in and now observers of DOD’s
expanding communication portfolio, the authors are particularly aware of
the argument that the US government needs to respond in real time to extremist propaganda in order to thwart violent extremism and lessen the need
for military intervention.
Yet DOD’s expansion into the field of interactive communication
is troubling on two counts. First, once the Department no longer labels its
communication measures as PSYOP, it potentially subverts its own statutory
authorities to conduct such programs. The Department has limited authorities to engage foreign audiences, and PSYOP are the principal authorized
mechanism to do so. In legal terms, in order to justify the use of appropriated funds, DOD activities are required to support a DOD-specific mission
and not conflict with the responsibility of another agency.8 Once DOD stops
calling interactive communication activities PSYOP and undertakes functions similar to those of another department, the “military mission” becomes
less defined.
Daniel Silverberg is counsel to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He served
as an Associate Deputy General Counsel in the Department of Defense Office of General
Counsel from 2005 to 2007.
Colonel Joseph Heimann, USAF, is the Senior Appellate Judge on the Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals. He previously was Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
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Second, DOD may be encroaching upon the Department of State’s mission to engage foreign audiences. The two departments’ missions, while overlapping, are distinct. DOD’s mission is one of influence; the State Department’s
mission is one of relationship-building and dialogue. The amalgamation
of these tasks potentially undermines the State Department’s efforts. At a
minimum, it forces one to ask exactly where does DOD’s mission end.
The concept of a “war” on terrorism has been extensively analyzed
in the context of detainee affairs. Numerous US Supreme Court cases and
academic treatises have evaluated the Bush Administration’s premise that
the United States is engaged in an international armed conflict against terrorist organizations and that detainees are enemy combatants subject to the
law of armed conflict.9 But labeling the ongoing effort a “global war” or
even a “worldwide irregular campaign” greatly expands the range of activities that can be justified as a “military mission.”10 Using such terminology
might be interpreted as grounds for giving DOD a significant role in areas
where the efforts of civilian agencies may be more appropriate.
This article outlines the legal authority for the Department of Defense to conduct communication-related functions; examines how the policy for interactive Internet activities creates a potentially problematic hybrid
activity; and assesses whether the policy for the Trans-Regional Web Initiative—an effort to establish a network of regional Web sites—constitutes
a tenable DOD mission. The authors conclude that (1) although the authorized activities have potential to be a useful tool in the fight against terrorism, the Department of Defense may need to seek new legal authorities
to undertake Internet-based communication; and (2) a conversation needs to
take place regarding the degree to which the current configuration should
be reworked to protect the missions of both DOD and the State Department
and to maximize the efficacy of all US government communication efforts.
Authorized Strategic Communication
The confusion regarding the role and scope of DOD psychological
operations in a worldwide irregular campaign stems from a long tradition
of ambiguity regarding the relationship between PSYOP, public affairs,
and public diplomacy. As a group, these three disciplines are often referred
to as “strategic communication.”11
The State Department’s authorities to communicate with foreign
audiences are unambiguous and detailed. Among other purposes, including
those of the now-defunct US Information Agency, the Secretary of State is
statutorily directed to use appropriate media to accomplish the following:
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[P]roperly explain the foreign policy of the United States to the governments
and populations of such countries . . . counter misinformation and propaganda concerning the United States . . . [and] continue to articulate the importance of freedom, democracy, and human rights as fundamental principles
underlying United States foreign policy goals.12

In contrast, there is minimal legislative guidance regarding DOD’s
authority to conduct information campaigns.13 Numerous statutes and directives permit the military departments to conduct public affairs, but there
are no DOD-focused statutes that define such programs.14 Similarly, Title
10 of the United States Code, section 167 authorizes the Department of
Defense to conduct psychological operations as part of special operations
campaigns.15 But Title 10 does not explain what PSYOP are, nor does it
spell out DOD’s authority to engage in PSYOP versus public diplomacy.16
The primary regulation governing PSYOP is a 1984 DOD directive, “Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime,” but this document provides minimal guidance.17
The definition of PSYOP in the directive is sufficiently vague to support
numerous activities:
Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals.

As noted by Carnes Lord in his 2006 study, this definition easily
could describe a majority of the public diplomacy practices conducted
by civilian agencies of the US government, although public diplomacy
and public affairs programs never use the term “influence” to characterize their activities.18
Among the legislative and regulatory specifications regarding the
scope of DOD’s PSYOP authority is the legal requirement that a federal
department perform only those missions for which it is authorized and
funded.19 This is based on the fiscal law principle that an agency may
not expend dollars unless it has authority to do so.20 The President, as
commander-in-chief, may direct the military to act, but the action must fall
within an authorized and funded activity. For example, DOD may conduct humanitarian relief operations,21 even though such assistance clearly
overlaps the mandate of the US Agency for International Development,
because DOD is authorized to do so within the auspices of Title 10.22
DOD’s strategic communication efforts also are limited by a
“publicity or propaganda rider” inserted annually in the defense appropriation act that prohibits use of funds for publicity or propaganda purposes
that are not authorized by Congress.23 In the absence of statutory defini80
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Much consternation exists in the foreign policy
community regarding DOD’s expansion into
missions usually performed by civilian agencies.

tions for PSYOP and public diplomacy, the rider ostensibly limits DOD
to conducting publicity or propaganda activities which Congress generally has approved—namely traditional PSYOP or other efforts in support
of a military mission.
To the extent a commander uses PSYOP to “shape a battlefield”
in direct support of a tactical military mission, such a role would likely be unassailable from a legal vantage point. In fact, commanders who
fail to use all available means to influence a battle, including preliminary actions to deter enemy forces or prevent civilian support for the enemy, might be considered derelict. But what happens when the use of
PSYOP is not tied to a specific mission? Has Congress authorized the
use of DOD funds for generalized, theater-level communication efforts?
Is it sufficient to conduct PSYOP under the banner that they support a
broad campaign, such as a regional counterterrorism effort, or that they
“shape the security environment”? When one eliminates the need for a
nexus between communication activities and a specific military mission,
such as PSYOP that support troop movement or complement force protection, then PSYOP theoretically can be conducted anywhere, for the
broadest of purposes. And that is where DOD is now.
Online Guidance
Confronted by commanders eager to use new media tools to influence foreign populations and a legal landscape marked by an outdated
PSYOP directive, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed
two policy memoranda in 2007. The stated purpose of the memoranda is to
“provide authority and guidance” for conducting communication through the
Internet. The first of these documents, “Policy for Department of Defense
(DOD) Interactive Internet Activities,”24 was signed on 8 June 2007, and the
second, “Policy for Combatant Command (COCOM) Regional Websites
Tailored to Foreign Audiences,” on 3 August 2007.25 The latter policy guidance was promulgated subsequent to a Joint Staff message that had been
issued on 5 April 2007.26
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The memoranda are intended to complement each other.27 The June
policy covers interactive Internet activities (IIA), defined as “the use of a
system accessible via the Internet which allows for two-way communications, e.g., e-mail, blogs, chat rooms, and Internet bulletin boards.”28 In
other words, the IIA guidance authorizes methods that enable DOD personnel to personally engage with foreign audiences and respond directly
to Internet postings, e-mail, and online statements. In contrast, the August
policy applies only to “non-interactive content on Combatant Command
regionally oriented Web sites tailored to foreign audiences.” For example,
DOD sponsors Web sites such as maghrebia.com, a news-like Web site focused
on the Maghreb that does not allow for interaction between individuals.
So what is the “authority and guidance” for DOD’s online activities?
To the extent possible, where has the Defense Department drawn the line in
cyberspace among PSYOP, public affairs, and support for public diplomacy,
and is this line legally defensible?
The Interactive Internet Activities Policy
The 8 June IIA guidance might be viewed as fusing PSYOP and
public affairs into a generic communication effort “to provide information
to the public, shape the security environment, and support military operations.”29 Interestingly, the policy provides no definitions for these terms, nor
does it refer explicitly to PSYOP. Instead, the memo asserts at the outset that
IIA are an “essential part” of the listed responsibilities, without distinguishing among them.30
The thrust of the IIA policy rests in a delegation of authority from
the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Geographic Combatant Commanders (and Commander, US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]
when designated as the supported commander)31 to approve IIA “in support of their operations and public affairs activities.”32 The significance of
this delegation cannot be overstated. Contrary to two decades of practice,
the delegation empowers commanders to conduct information operations at
their discretion. Previously they had to seek senior-level Department approval.
In essence, this means that a Combatant Commander who wishes to blog
on an Arab Web site or exchange e-mails with a Muslim commentator may
do so without additional approval.33
Scope of Activities
In addition to the delegation of authority, the memorandum
spells out two categories of activities to which the policy applies: Public affairs activities and “programs, products, and actions that shape
82
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emotions, motives, reasoning, and behaviors of selected foreign entities.” As described in the IIA’s statement of purpose, public affairs (PA)
involves, in part, “provid[ing] information to the public.”34 The guidance includes a key limitation: Only PA personnel may engage in Internet-based exchanges with journalists. The policy specifically requires:
Combatant Commanders and [the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs] will ensure that only public affairs personnel engage in interactive
Internet activities with journalists employed by media organizations including news Web sites, online bulletin boards, and blog sites affiliated with
news organizations.35

The policy defines media broadly to include “journalists employed by media organizations including Web sites, online bulletin boards, and blog sites
affiliated with news organizations” and those individuals and Web sites that
have achieved a status equivalent to an established news organization.36
Theoretically, there should be little controversy regarding the provision of information to the public or media. Although no specific definition for DOD public affairs exists in statute, Congress has not interfered
with DOD’s authority to inform the public, foreign and domestic, regarding its activities. From a policy perspective, one would hope that DOD
would communicate with foreign media, particularly those in the everexpanding online arena, to articulate its perspective on events.37
Yet the guidance potentially recasts PSYOP-like initiatives as a
public affairs activity by authorizing only public affairs personnel to
use interactive Internet tools to engage journalists employed by a media
organization. The policy restricts who may interact with foreign journalists, but it does not restrict the type of activities in which public affairs
personnel may engage. One may presume that public affairs personnel
would exclusively employ “public affairs” tools, but the guidance is
ambiguous. Thus, the policy could be interpreted as permitting public
affairs personnel to engage in “shaping emotions, motives, reasoning,
and behaviors of selected foreign entities”—the specified purview of
PSYOP practitioners.
Under the new authority, a commander may choose to focus on
online outlets “that have become news sources for large audiences” to
maximize his effort (why pursue communication with a single blogger
when a commander can reach a broader audience?). Thus, the policy
would permit public affairs personnel to engage in both PA and PSYOPlike affairs.
In addition to public affairs activities, the IIA guidance authorizes “actions that shape emotions, motives, reasoning, and behaviors
of selected foreign entities.”38 This phrasing is curious for two reasons.
Summer 2009
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But labeling the ongoing effort a “global war”
or even a “worldwide irregular campaign”
greatly expands the range of activities that can be
justified as a “military mission.”

First, the language is nearly identical to the definition of PSYOP, except for use of the term “shape” instead of “influence.” Second, contrary
to the limitation of media contact to “public affairs personnel,” the policy does not say who may implement communications that shape emotions and behaviors on behalf of the Geographic Combatant Commander
(GCC). In fact, the policy is silent regarding those most likely to use IIA
methods—PSYOP forces—whose historical mission is to influence foreign audiences via information operations and whose training involves
“motivating” behavior and “shaping” emotions. Although the policy
would allow PSYOP forces to add IIA to their list of authorized means
of disseminating messages to shape a battlespace, it also potentially allows other personnel—public affairs practitioners and others—to engage
in activities traditionally performed by PSYOP specialists.
The ambiguity regarding who will conduct these shaping activities is legally significant for the following reason: Once one amalgamates
the public affairs mission to “inform” with the PSYOP mission to “influence,” the statutory basis to conduct the activity becomes increasingly
dubious. A DOD agenda to “shape emotions” may well overlap with the State
Department mission to counter propaganda; both programs involve communicating with foreign audiences in order to positively shape their views of the
United States. Once DOD separates IIA from psychological operations and
removes a requirement that Internet communication be linked to a specific
military mission conducted by PSYOP forces, DOD undermines the very
authority it has to conduct such activities, Title 10, section 167. Absent the
statutory authority of Title 10, the policy itself simply purports to authorize
influence operations that are the equivalent of a State Department function.
Prior to the policy change, DOD exclusively relied upon PSYOP
forces to conduct “influence” operations. It trained PSYOP practitioners to work within long-standing regulatory directives that limited the
scope of their activities and required extensive oversight. If PSYOP
forces are no longer required for online strategic communication, then
the training, capability, and oversight tied to the underlying authority
are lost.
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The blurring of the lines of authority becomes even more acute
when a GCC chooses to use contractors to provide IIA support. The
new policy expressly permits contractor involvement so long as there
is “rigorous US government oversight.”39 Notwithstanding the practical
difficulties of providing “oversight” to instantaneous interactive communications such as text messaging and blogging, the policy injects a third
group into the mix by authorizing nonmilitary, nongovernmental personnel to engage with foreign audiences.
In summary, the IIA policy empowers commanders to engage in cyber
activities away from a battlefield, with personnel who might not be trained in
“influence” activities. Perhaps this is a positive development, as DOD is primarily seeking to engage civilian audiences using critical, nonkinetic methods
of influence. Yet the breadth of authority bestowed on Combatant Commanders
to engage in communication activities raises the question of whether a legislative
“fix” is necessary to fully define DOD’s responsibilities.
Limitations on IIA Policy
The policy contains four primary limitations.40 First, it requires that all
IIA conducted under its authority “will be accurate and true in fact and intent.”
Second, the policy provides that a Geographic Combatant Commander
will coordinate IIA with the US ambassador, as appropriate. This caveat could
be interpreted in a number of ways. The phrase “as appropriate” possibly means
that coordination is necessary only when the GCC assesses that it is. It might
also mean that a commander has to coordinate with each ambassador who is accredited to a nation impacted by the IIA. If one pursues the latter interpretation,
the limitation potentially causes conflict with existing military programs. Legally, a commander assigned a mission from the President or Secretary of Defense
to execute a military operation abroad has no obligation to seek the approval of,
or even coordinate with, an ambassador. The GCC decides the limits of the mission to “defend the United States” and the times when it is “appropriate” to consult with the ambassador regarding how the commander attempts to fulfill the
mission (in fact, coordination does occur as a matter of prudence and good practice). A requirement to coordinate with the US ambassador thus imposes a restriction on commanders that does not exist in traditional military missions.41
Third, the policy has an “attribution” provision. Read in conjunction with the statutory provision restricting DOD’s conduct of covert
operations, this section simply states a preference for US involvement in
IIA to be “openly acknowledged.”42 The policy offers commanders two exceptions. First, it permits a commander to attribute his or her IIA activities
to a “concurring partner nation” if the partner nation and the US chief of
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Contrary to two decades of practice, the delegation
empowers commanders to conduct information
operations at their discretion.
mission agree. Second, the policy grants permission to disseminate information via IIA without “clear attribution” in support of a named operation
in the Global War on Terrorism or when specified in a Secretary of Defenseapproved Execute Order when attribution is not possible due to “operational
considerations.” The policy stipulates that a commander will disclose US
attribution “as soon as operationally feasible.” Because a named operation
may be geographically broad or nonkinetic, this limitation could empower commanders to engage in clandestine IIA across a wide geographic area. This limitation offers no guidance on where the State Department’s or even possibly
the Central Intelligence Agency’s role and authorities intersect with DOD’s
in conducting influence operations via the Internet.
Finally, the policy expressly provides that commanders may not
delegate the authority granted in the policy. This limitation simply affects
who may direct the mechanisms used, and it has no bearing on the underlying substance of the activity.
The IIA policy grants broad authority to GCCs to use IIA in support
of their missions. By not specifying who may engage in “shaping operations”
or limiting the geographic scope of such activities, the policy in essence establishes a hybrid PSYOP-public affairs model. The activity is, at a minimum,
one of publicity, and likely one of propaganda. Yet the personnel engaging in
operations to “shape” the emotions and motives of foreign audiences might
not necessarily be PSYOP specialists, and the underlying mission itself—to
“shape a security environment”—has little definition.
The Trans-Regional Web Initiative
As part of a campaign to counter terrorist influence, US European
Command initiated two Web sites in 2007. That program led to the establishment of the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI), a USSOCOM-led
plan to synchronize all Combatant Command Web sites that are tailored
to foreign audiences.43 These Web sites provide news on political happenings, good governance, and other matters of concern to Geographic Combatant Commanders, with the intent of countering hostile propaganda and
extremist influence. The TRWI program was approved in a 5 April 2007
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message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which also includes policy guidance for the TRWI.44
The TRWI message states that the regional Web sites are critical
to “shaping [a Combatant Command’s] security environment” by enabling
commanders to reach out to large audiences:
Web-based operations are an inexpensive and potentially effective method
of communicating directly to target audiences with messages shaping the
security environment in a Combatant Command’s area of responsibility by
supporting US interests, the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) theater security cooperation strategies, the respective country team objectives,
and USSOCOM [Global War on Terrorism] objectives. Web sites tailored
to foreign audiences can contribute to overall mission accomplishment by
countering extremist and terrorist elements, countering hostile propaganda,
promoting stability and security, building support for US counterterrorism
and associated activities worldwide, and supporting GCC theater security cooperation efforts.45

These objectives deserve analysis, as they hint at the amorphous
nature of the initiative. The purposes described could refer to a majority
of US government activities abroad; any military effort could be said to
be justified if it improves the image of the United States. Moreover, the
TRWI’s objectives explicitly overlap with the State Department’s statutory
mandate to “explain the foreign policy of the United States to the governments and populations of such countries . . . [and] counter misinformation
and propaganda concerning the United States.”46 These goals are arguably
the same as the TRWI mission to support US government counterterrorism
and GCC theater security cooperation efforts; both involve reaching out to
foreign audiences in an attempt to change perceptions regarding America
and to counter extremist propaganda. The overlap would not be troublesome if the TRWI supported a specific military mission. Yet the TRWI is,
by definition, regional and nonspecific. Unlike a IIA activity, DOD cannot
“target” an enemy force with a Web site. In summary, because the TRWI
Web sites are by their very nature not in direct and immediate support of
military operations, the military mission underpinning these region-wide interests seems ambiguous.47
Who Executes the TRWI?
Similar to the IIA memorandum, the TRWI message also provides
minimal guidance regarding who executes or maintains the sites. The
message unequivocally declares that the TRWI is not a public affairs activity (“[this guidance] does not apply to public affairs Web sites.”).48 While it
is possible to foresee a non-public affairs Web site configured in support
Summer 2009
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of ongoing military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, DOD’s appropriate role becomes significantly less clear when a TRWI-sponsored Web site
emerges elsewhere, where combat is not taking place.
The message is also silent on the role of PSYOP forces. Each Web
site is required to contain a disclaimer that “clearly identifies the sponsoring Combatant Commander . . . on the homepage of the Web site.”49 Use of
.com, .net, and .gov Internet addresses also is specified, unless the Deputy
Secretary of Defense authorizes use of other domains.50 In likely response
to the Lincoln Group incident, if a writer is paid for online work, “the article
will fully and clearly disclose such payment.”51 In content and appearance, the
Web sites resemble formal news sites or diplomatic publications, not military periodicals. Without an indication of who formulates the content and
executes the TRWI on behalf of Combatant Commands, it is difficult to
discern the precise nature of the activity.
Finally, the “military” aspect of the TRWI becomes increasingly
nebulous once third parties are hired to execute the program.52 In January 2008, USSOCOM issued a solicitation for contractors to perform the
sensitive cultural and political tasks inherent in creating and sustaining the
Web sites. The notice included the following requirement:
The contractor shall: Develop, operate, and maintain a minimum of six Web
sites, in the directed languages and conceptual approaches approved by the
Government; Develop, operate, and maintain Web sites tailored to influence foreign audiences per Government-approved Concepts of Operations
(CONOPs), conceptual approaches, and previously approved prototypes;
Provide full-service cultural knowledge, political, editorial, media, and information technology capabilities; Identify, develop, obtain, and maintain a network of native/indigenous content contributors with backgrounds in politics,
academics, security, culture, entertainment, and other aspects of the [Global
War on Terrorism], which appeal to identified foreign target audiences.53

One is left to wonder about the military nature of a Web site that is
contracted out to civilian, possibly foreign, personnel. From a policy perspective, DOD’s sponsorship of the Web sites is troublesome due to the fact
that creating such forums requires comprehension of local political events
and circumstances, functions typically the purview of civilian US agencies.
Limitations on TRWI Policy
Similar to the IIA, the TRWI policy contains three primary limitations. First, it expressly declares that the authority may not be delegated.
Contrary to the IIA policy, however, the TRWI provides a “geographic”
limitation when it specifies that Web sites have to be “regionally oriented.”
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Theoretically, there should be little controversy
regarding provision of information to the public.

While the concept of physical limitation on a Web site is illusory, it provides a specification that helps crystallize the question of DOD’s authority.
Second, the policy states that a Geographic Combatant Commander will
collaborate, as appropriate, with the Department of State, other US government
agencies, and country teams in affected nations to coordinate themes and
messages, orient to and emphasize specific issues, and recruit regional contributors and key communicators.54 The caveat “as appropriate” negates the
prospect of this limitation resolving the issue of DOD’s authority to conduct
strategic communication in the place of other government agencies.
Third, the policy has a “transparency” provision. Contrary to the
IIA policy that permits different methods of attribution, the Web site memorandum expressly requires that “[a]ll Web sites within the scope of this
policy will display a disclaimer link that clearly identifies the sponsoring
Combatant Command on the home page of the Web site . . . .”55 When this
requirement is read in conjunction with the statement that the policy does
not apply to public affairs Web sites, one is left to question what exactly is
the nature of the activity.
Finally, while not a limitation, the policy states that any exceptions,
requests for additional authorities, or recommended changes to the policy
will be directed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and that the “Strategic
Communication Integration Group Executive Committee” will support the
Deputy Secretary in consideration of any such requests.56
In summary, the TRWI policy grants broad authority to GCCs to
create and maintain Web sites to “shape the security environment” in their
areas of responsibility. While these sites require truthful information and complete transparency, they are expressly forbidden from being public affairs Web
sites. That stipulation begs the question, what are they? Are they PSYOP
being conducted by trained forces in support of a specific mission, or are
they public diplomacy sites recast in military terms?
Conclusion
This article highlights a specific example of DOD’s expanding
mission in the war against terrorism. Arguably, the end goals for US
national security agencies, including the State and Defense departments,
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One may presume that public affairs personnel
would exclusively employ “public affairs” tools,
but the guidance is ambiguous.
are the same: Stop extremist activity, thwart terrorist violence, and advance
overall US political and economic interests. For a variety of reasons, DOD
has assumed control of many of the tools necessary to turn these goals into reality, including strategic communication. The Defense Department’s initial efforts to define the authority, scope, and limits of these influence activities are set
out in the 2007 policy memoranda. By issuing these memoranda, DOD has
significantly blurred its own long-standing distinctions between public affairs
and psychological operations. These distinctions were critical in helping military
commanders understand the authority and limits of strategic communication
efforts. The decision not to define the latest programs as PSYOP raises significant legal questions regarding the authority for DOD to conduct such
activities. When DOD expressly does not label these influence operations
as PSYOP, has the Department in effect surrendered the authority it has to
conduct such operations?
Ultimately, DOD’s participation in the “battle of ideas” raises both
policy and fiscal questions. In policy terms, DOD may be conducting programs that rightfully belong to another agency. A typical comment today is
that the State Department has all the authorities to conduct public diplomacy, but DOD has all the resources. DOD has responded, in kind, by using
military terms to define civilian activities for which the Department of State
has purview. If DOD is conducting public diplomacy, it should come out
and say so. That way Congress knows how appropriated funds are being
used, and whether funds are applied for the right purposes, in the most
impactful manner.
In dollar terms, DOD’s expansion into online strategic communication has potential to further undermine the capacity of civilian agencies, a
situation which gave rise to the need for DOD to engage in these activities
in the first place. At a certain point, if an agency’s mission is viewed as indistinct, that agency’s mission becomes a function of the budget process,
and the need for funds becomes open-ended.
A new type of PSYOP method may be necessary to fight a “global
irregular campaign.” It could be a hybrid initiative that draws upon classic
forms of military support to public diplomacy and PSYOP.57 Perhaps existing lines of authority are obsolete and need to be restructured to encompass
today’s ever-expanding communication methods. Clearly, a structured re90
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view needs to take place to determine whether the Department of Defense
possesses adequate legal authority to conduct the Internet-based missions
necessary in the ongoing fight against terrorism.
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